For over a decade Estonia has been untouched by terrorist violence. However, notwithstanding the lack of a viable terrorist threat, the Estonian government adopted extensive counterterrorism measures. What explains the scope of Estonia's counterterrorism measures? The main proposition of this article is that the content of states' counterterrorism policies is shaped by the types of responses adopted by their reference groups. The evidence examined in the study demonstrates that Estonia's primary reference groups, NATO and the EU, have influenced the republic's counterterrorism programme. An unattractive target to terrorists, Estonia adopted broad counterterrorism responses to defend indivisible Euro-Atlantic security and to protect democratic values that terrorists attempt to destroy. 
disapproval of Estonia's military engagement in Iraq, the government sent a 43-member regiment to Baghdad, a notable size for an army that averages 3,800 servicemen in peacetime. In the war against terrorism, Estonia has contributed millions of US dollars, thereby straining the republican budget. What explains the scope of Estonia's counterterrorism activities and operations?
Rival explanations of state behaviour
Political science is replete with approaches that can be used to explain states' international and domestic actions, and even more theoretical models can be drawn from the adjacent disciplines. To explain the scope of Estonia's counterterrorism measures, this article adopts a reference group perspective, which integrates an explicitly 'social' element into the models of state behaviour and explains how a given government may emulate the counterterrorism policies of some states, but not of others, and how cross-pressures arising from membership in different groups of states are resolved. The reference group theory postulates that a given state's counterterrorism responses are strongly influenced by the 'social groups' of states to which it aspires to gain or maintain membership, or by those states whose material resources or information are necessary for the given state to achieve their political, economic, expressive, and other goals. It is argued here that the reference group theory offers a stronger explanatory account of Estonia's counterterrorism policies than two competing analytical paradigms, namely Rationalism and Constructivism. Additionally, it can be extrapolated to other states and issue-areas extending beyond counterterrorism (Omelicheva 2007 ).
In the context of international relations, Rationalism has become associated with the positivist tradition of explaining policy choices by reference to goal-seeking behaviour (Fearon & Wendt 2002, p. 54) . In a narrower sense, Rationalism explains state behaviour in functional terms: the actor performs an action if the costs associated with it do not exceed the expected benefits from the action. According to this axiom, the magnitude of terrorist violence and national capabilities should determine the scope of states' responses to terrorism. A variant of the Rationalist framework, Realism, would explain Estonia's counterterrorism responses in utilitarian terms as a pursuance of exogenously given self-interest in security under anarchical conditions. It would present Estonia's policies as dependent on NATO, which it sought to join in order to protect its national security from its historical enemy, Russia (Noreen & Sjöstedt 2004) .
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In understanding state behaviour in such terms, the reference group perspective comes close to constructivism in that it stresses the importance of social context and the impact of various ideational forces, such as identity, culture and norms. Adopting a constructivist approach, Aalto (2003) , Kuus (2002) and Noreen and Sjöstedt (2004) , for example, make use of collective identity as an explanatory variable of Estonia's policies within the context of European and North Atlantic security institutions. The notions of collective identity and reference groups are intimately related. The same cognitive processes of categorisation, social comparison, and identification underlie the development of collective identities and the use of reference groups. The view that a state can have multiple collective identities is also shared by both perspectives. Constructivist approaches, however, using the concept of identity, eschew the idea of explaining why states consider that measuring up in relation to the norms and standards of some groups is more important than others, and how states reconcile cross-pressures arising from membership in different social groups. As will be seen below, explaining how the Estonian government resolved what it perceived as the conflicting expectations of the EU and NATO regarding the Iraqi military operation and support for the International Criminal Court would have been challenging within the collective identity framework.
Another weakness of many identity-based perspectives is that they rarely contain a general framework that can illustrate and explain how and why states with particular types of identities act in various social situations (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001) . The reference group approach, on the other hand, illuminates mechanisms and conditions of group identification from which the actions of other states in various issue areas can be inferred. Importantly, the functioning of reference groups does not require the level of identification that makes collective identity virtually non-existent in international relations and extremely difficult to establish empirically. Researchers can plausibly establish states' reference groups based on characteristics enumerated in this study.
The notion of reference groups is also related to the concept of international socialisation. Both share a core sociological insight that agents' behaviour is shaped by the groups to which they belong. A subtle but important difference is that the prevailing understanding of international socialisation defined as a 'process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community' (Checkel 2005, p. 804 retains sociological emphasis on the social context, while the reference group perspective favours a socialpsychological formula presenting behaviour as a function of both the person and the social group. The latter conception stresses the purposeful aspect of state behaviour driven by various goals, and derives expectations about behavioural changes by inspecting the interplay of social forces and their ability to meet states' expressive, utilitarian, and informational needs. It is argued here that in order to gain and maintain their acceptance, political support and other forms of assistance, the Estonian government has closely followed the perspectives and polices of key reference groups, including those in the area of counterterrorism.
The reference group approach to state behaviour
Originally conceived by social psychologists, the reference group perspective is based on the principle that individuals are influenced by the standards and values of other individuals and groups in making judgments, self-appraisals and behavioural choices (Hyman 1968; Kelley 1952; Newcomb 1958) . In the literature of international politics it has been noted that state leaders, too, refer to external models for making policy-related decisions (Agyeman-Duah & Olatunde 1991; Price 1971; Rivera 2004) . It is suggested that the similarity of human social behaviour at different levels of aggregation opens up a possibility for inferring state conduct from individuals' actions. Since it is through their human agents that states interact, form relationships and interpret the behaviour of other states, it can be surmised that states, like individuals, relate and compare themselves to other states (Cronin 1999; Wendt 1999) .
States that set and enforce standards of behaviour for other states, or are accepted by the political elites of other states as an appropriate source of information for making judgments about the legitimacy and adequacy of their actions can therefore be seen as a 'reference group'. With respect to counterterrorism specifically, a reference group is a state or a group of states that guides and orients other states' responses to terrorism by endorsing and enforcing principles of counterterrorism activities and by providing information about the legitimacy and effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. Typically, a reference group is an organisation of states to which a given state aspires to join as a member. However, the reference group does not have to be a membership-based international organisation. Neither do states composing the reference group have to engage in dense interactions and form complex interdependencies (Price 1971, p. 404) . The reference group is a perception-based social category that does not require face-to-face contact States emulate the policies of other states for different reasons. A government may adopt a counterterrorism measure endorsed by other states for instrumental reasons, fir example in order to secure material benefits, such as military assistance, or to avoid punishments mediated by others. The group of states that is believed to wield significant power which can be used for providing tangible rewards or imposing material losses on other states is known as a 'utilitarian' reference group. Alternatively a government's emulation of other states' policies may be driven by value-expressive motives, which refer to a state's need to enhance or maintain its positive image and to define itself through the expression of important values and alignment with other groups of states (Herek 1986, p. 106) . In this case the group is known as the 'normative' reference group (Hyman 1968; Kelley 1952) . To promote its acceptance, the state brings its policies and behaviour into conformity with what is perceived as group's norms and values.
Through this conformity to standards of behaviour of the normative reference group, a state can gain a symbolic sense of acceptance by the group. This outcome can heighten the state's self-image and esteem (Blanton & Christie 2003, p.123) . Finally, when a state lacks complete and accurate information about different aspects of its environment, it will rely on the knowledge provided by other states for making and justifying its policy decisions. The group of states that supplies information, which facilitates states' judgments about the legitimacy and adequacy of their actions is known as a 'comparison' reference group.
Comparing its policies against those of the reference group, the government can learn about different aspects of state programmes responsible for their success.
A state, typically, may belong to several utilitarian, normative and comparison reference groups.
The prominence of a reference group, its ability to capture the attention of political elites and induce the state's behavioural compliance, is known as the 'salience' of the group. There are several factors that determine the attractiveness of the normative reference group (see Table 1 ). The most important one is the 'social psychological proximity' developed on the basis of historical, institutional and value similarities (Rose 1993, p. 105; Weil 1993, p. 198 regime, religion or ethnicity) that are salient to the members of these groups are more likely to be perceived as appropriate normative referents. Among other factors that strengthen the appeal of normative reference groups are the following: the status of the reference group (Majone 1991; Weil 1993) ; the tangible and intangible benefits of being a part of the reference groups, such as exclusive rights and privileges (Agyeman-Duah & Olatunde 1991, p. 299) ; geographical proximity (Mooney 2001) ; and acceptance by other members of the group. Thus, a state is likely to adopt norms and perspectives of a normative reference group that is perceived as similar to it in some important ways, as having a positive image, or as beneficial to it. When this normative group is also geographically close, the state will be further inclined to identify with the group (Rivera 2004) .
States adopt norms and perspectives of the utilitarian reference group for instrumental reasons.
The impact of this group of states depends on the intensity of a state's instrumental goals and the ability of the utilitarian group to satisfy them. The size of the group's material resources and its ability to engage in the types of behaviour that can create significant benefits or costs for the state will modify the extent of influence of the utilitarian reference group. Finally, those states that are interested in acquiring new information for finding or optimising solutions to policy problems will turn to comparison reference groups. A group that is believed to have expertise and experience in a specified issue-area is likely to be a role model for other states. What also matters is the perceived similarity or geographical proximity of the comparison group and a borrowing state (Rivera 2004 relations with the group as beneficial to Estonia's image; and that it adopted the group's policies and perspectives to promote Estonia's acceptance by the group. The utilitarian reference group can be identified on the basis of expressed and inferred state interest in obtaining rewards or avoiding punishment mediated by the group. The comparison reference group can be ascertained through explicit and implicit references to the experiences and expertise of the group as the basis for Estonia's policy emulation.
Since it is the foreign policy makers who maintain relations with other states, and outline directions of the state foreign policy, the focus of the article is on the verbal and written communications of Estonia's key foreign policy players. According to the Constitution of Estonia and the Foreign Relations Act of 1993, the primary foreign policy actors are the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament), the president, the government of Estonia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, the primary sources of data will be the foreign minister's declarations, statements of foreign policy objectives and addresses to the Riigikogu and international organisations; the president's speeches and addresses pertaining to Estonia's foreign policy; and the Riigikogu's foreign policy decisions, declarations and communications concerning relations between states.
Estonia's reference groups
In 1991, when Estonia broke away from the Soviet Union, it was deeply concerned about its security and independence. About 10,000 fully trained and de-mobilised Soviet troops-five times as big as Estonia's poorly equipped defence forces-occupied the republic. Russia insisted on keeping its military forces in the Baltic region to counter what it perceived as the main threat to Russian interests from the so-called 'New Abroad' (Trofimov 1992) . Thus, Estonia's main goal in the early 1990s was the removal foreign troops and safeguarding its national security from the threat of Russia, and Estonia's leaders acknowledged that the country could not achieve this by itself (Ojuland 2002) . '[Estonians] can guarantee [their] security through collective security arrangement of an alliance. At present, the only such an alliance is NATO', declared the speaker of the Riigikogu, Ulo Nugis, in October 1991 (Riim 2006, p. 49) .
A further important foreign policy goal was to transform Estonia's image from second tier postcommunist state into a European state (Ilves 1999a concerned with our external identity than most countries. And so we should be. As a small country, we must constantly develop our international image' (Ilves 1999b, p. 3).
To receive security guarantees and recognition as a European state, Estonia's government zealously pursued integration into the Euro-Atlantic organisations. This became a leitmotiv of the Estonian government's discourse and a guiding principle of its foreign and public policy. Membership of the NATO collective security system was viewed as a powerful deterrent to Russia's hostile ambitions, while being a part of the EU 'carried with it a powerful marker of inclusion and identification as "Western" and "European"' (Laffan 2004, p. 75) . Representative democracy, commitment to human freedoms and respect for the rule of law are essential characteristics shared by all members of the European Union (Laffan 2004, p. 81) . NATO, too, has made protection of these principles and values its watchword (NATO 1991 (NATO , 1999 Riim 2006) . To warrant entry into NATO and the EU, Estonia's politicians stressed the commonality of values between Estonia and these organisations. In foreign policy statements delivered at the European Parliament, at Western universities, and during EU and NATO meetings, Estonian policy makers stressed that their republic valued above all democracy, freedom, peace and the rule of law. The declared continuity between the modern republic of Estonia and the parliamentary republic established in 1920 was intended to give credence to the proclaimed value of representative democracy as a backbone of the Estonian independent statehood. Thus, for Estonia NATO and the EU became the most significant reference groups. The norms, practices and perspectives of NATO and the EU have strongly influenced Estonia's views on world politics and have been employed as the benchmarks for Estonia's policies by the republic's political elites. In his study of Estonia's national interest, Toomas Riim (2006) traces changes in the discourse and defence policies of Estonia's leadership to the transformation of NATO's strategic vision. To muster the Alliance's support, the Estonian government adopted NATO's perspectives on security issues, and implemented extensive military reforms to bring its defence policies and institutions in line with those of NATO (Riim 2006, p. 41) . Estonia also committed itself to the fight for democracy, international crisis management and peace operations, especially where NATO had been involved (Ojuland 2002 ).
To become a member of the EU, Estonia used the Union's foundational principles and values as a yardstick for its domestic and foreign policy actions and reforms, especially from 1994 onwards (Ilves (Ilves 1999b, p. 3).
Initially, NATO and, to a lesser degree, the EU, served Estonia's instrumental goals in that they provided 'hard' and 'soft' security guarantees against a historical source of threat to Estonia's independence posed by Russia (Riim 2006, p. 4l) .
1 Under considerable political pressure from Estonia's Western partners, Russia withdrew its troops from Estonian territory in the autumn of 1994. Then, as a member of NATO, Estonia received additional security guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, as well as other economic and security benefits (Ilves 1997) . As a candidate for EU and NATO membership, Estonia received ample assistance for its policy reforms. Membership of the EU opened up the Union's market to Estonian companies, workers, students and tourists who received greater opportunities for exporting products, working and studying as well as moving around within the borders of the EU.
At the same time, NATO, and especially, the EU have become important normative groups which Estonia aspired to join. Membership in these organisations was perceived as extremely beneficial to Estonia's self-concept and international image. 'Our EU prospects have improved our overall status on the international arena', declared Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilves, in 1999 (Ilves 1999b 
European Union
The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a new momentum for EU counterterrorism legislative initiatives and law-enforcement cooperation between its members (Archick 2005) . Although terrorism has been a big and economic and social development (EU Council 1995 . Any state founded on these principles shares a responsibility for protecting these values against the threat of terrorism.
Preventing terrorism: the influence of the EU counterterrorism programme
The analysis of risks and trends of terrorism constitutes an important element of the 'prevention' aspect of the EU counterterrorism strategy. In fulfilment of this goal, all member states are required to identify factors contributing to the recruitment of terrorists ( To achieve the aims of the third, 'pursuit' aspect of the EU counterterrorism strategy, member states are expected to strengthen their national capabilities to combat terrorism, carry out cross-border investigation of terrorist acts, and detect and disrupt terrorists' financial channels, communications and travel. In Estonia, the Security Police Board plays the primary direct role in combating terrorism (Spencer 2006 
Military preparedness and participation: the influence of NATO's counterterrorism measures
In view of NATO's contemporary goals and its emphasis on the development of rapid response forces, the 
Explaining Estonian emulation of its partners
The measures enacted by the Estonian government in the area of counterterrorism and the discourse surrounding their adoption demonstrate that EU and NATO views on the threat of terrorism and their counterterrorism policies have had a strong bearing on Estonia's responses to terrorism. Estonian officials 
Reconciling differences in the counterterrorism approaches of NATO and the EU: the invasion of Iraq and human rights
The counterterrorism policies of NATO and the EU, for the most part, reinforce and complement each The government acknowledged its responsibility towards returning stability in Iraq, and while sectarian violence continued to engulf the state, the Estonian government decided that it was not possible to withdraw troops (Easmaa 2005) . Thus, the extension of Estonia's mission in the Middle East has been the result of the normative influence of Estonia's reference groups.
The Estonian government has become more vigilant in ensuring the consistency of its activities 
Discussion and conclusions
The goal of this study was to explain the scope of the counterterrorism policies of Estonia, which, in the absence of terrorist threat, adopted a broad spectrum of measures aimed at combating terrorism in different areas of public and foreign policy. The reference group perspective was used to demonstrate that social groups of states, whose membership other states aspire to gain or maintain, or which offer material resources or information necessary for other states to achieve their political, economic, or other goals, exert strong influence on such other states' counterterrorism responses. By contrast a significant merit of the reference group approach is in its interrogation and disaggregation states' interests and goals, and examining them through the prism of history, existing political configurations and the socio-economic milieu. Internationally, states operate in a number of social settings. Each international institution can be more or less actively involved in socialising potential members into the behavioural modes that it approves of. Socialisation approaches have grappled with striking differences in the pace and depth of international socialisation (Checkel 2005) . The reference group All in all, the reference group perspective does not contradict the idea of international socialisation. Instead, it systematises the mechanisms and scope conditions (see Table 1 ) under which different types of social influence occur. Studies examining how and why states adopt new behavioural modes and roles typically privilege either the rational choice or the socialisation approach (Johnson 2005) , and catalogue multifarious processes-bargaining, persuasion, teaching or learning-through which international socialisation can take place (Zürn & Checkel 2005) . The reference group perspective provides an integrative framework of normative, strategic and psychological sources of international influence on the assumption that by studying the interplay of strategic behaviour with social and psychological forces our understanding of how states transform their views and policies can be considerably improved. As noted above, for over a decade, Estonia has been untouched by terrorist violence and less than 5% of the Estonian public regards terrorism as a national problem (European Commission 2004) . The present analysis found that it was not until NATO and the EU brought the issue of terrorism to the fore of their security concerns that the Estonian governments began tackling the threat of terrorism, and Estonia's views on terrorism have always corresponded to the position promoted by the EU and NATO. Although this study and the related research have confirmed that the threatening posture of Russia was a major concern that propelled the Estonian government to seek security guarantees from NATO, this threat had dissipated even before the century's turn. After the Kremlin withdrew its troops from Estonia, the Estonian government began downplaying the threat of Russia in favour of other political concerns (Aalto 2003; Noreen & Sjöstedt 2004) . Furthermore, Estonia as well as other second-wave candidates to NATO adopted a series of costly political actions and military reforms without any assurances that they would receive the reward of membership and the desired protection of NATO (Gheciu 2005, p. 974) . Therefore, the fear of Russia cannot completely account for Estonia's counterterrorism policies and reforms.
There are multiple avenues for developing the reference group theory further and extending its empirical reach outside of the European space. For instance, in the case of Estonia, the locus of both utilitarian and normative influence coincided in the same groups of states, and the counterterrorism policies of the EU and NATO have had a complementary nature. Therefore, it has been largely unproblematic for Estonia to transpose its counterterrorism legislation, establish necessary institutions, and adopt other policies promoted by these organisations in the field of counterterrorism. A greater empirical challenge would be to study those cases where the seat of the normative and utilitarian influence is split among several groups of states, and where different social groups put forth conflicting expectations of their members' behaviour. Another direction for future research is to investigate further the mechanisms and scope conditions under which a shift from behavioural compliance based on a cost-benefit calculation to normative conformance based on the internalisation of groups' norms takes place. The logical range of possible internationalisation and identity change also needs more elaboration and investigation.
Adopting a group's perspectives for value-expressive reasons translates to the internalisation of the group's norms, and any deviation from the course of actions promoted by the normative group should create a meaningful threat to state identity. The Estonian government believes that the republic's European democratic nation. Because the adoption of EU and NATO perspectives has occurred at a much deeper level of internalisation of the groups' norms, this study has concluded that Estonia will remain an active participant in peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations, and a generous contributor to development funds, in spite of the lack of a direct contribution of these policies to the republic's security. 
